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The hypothesis that consumers have rational expectations about relevant 
economic variables is a maintained assumption in the vast majority of asset pricing 
models.  This assumption is attractive because it seems optimal for self-interested 
consumers to use some resources to forecast variables of interest.  This assumption is also 
attractive because it avoids the myriad modeling choices that arise once the discipline of 
rational expectations is removed.   Nevertheless, the assumption of rational expectations 
is simply an assumption—an assumption that could turn out not to be true.   
Recent work by Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (2000) has analyzed an asset pricing 
model with various departures from rational expectations.  A major finding of that paper 
is that a model with conventional preferences in which consumers exhibit pessimistic 
beliefs can better match sample moments of asset returns than can a rational expectations 
model.  I will use a simpler asset pricing model here to explore how two particular 
departures from rationality—pessimism and doubt—affect the means of asset returns.  I 
define the subjective distribution of growth rates of aggregate consumption per capita to 
be characterized by pessimism if it is first-order stochastically dominated by the objective 
distribution.1  The subjective distribution of growth rates is characterized by doubt if it is 
a mean-preserving spread of the objective distribution.   I describe the analysis as 
exploratory in nature because I simply take pessimism and doubt as given, without 
modeling the source of departures from complete rationality of expectations.  I focus on 
the implications of pessimism and doubt for asset returns, and explore whether pessimism 
and doubt can help resolve some asset pricing puzzles. 
                                                          
1 This definition of pessimism is more restrictive and more precise than the use of the term “pessimism” in 
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000). 
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In section I, I develop a simple model of asset pricing in which consumers’ 
subjective distribution of the growth rate of aggregate consumption differs from the 
objective distribution.  I use this model in section II to show that pessimism reduces the 
riskfree rate.  I define uniform pessimism as a leftward translation of the objective 
distribution of the logarithm of the growth rate of aggregate consumption, and then I 
show that uniform pessimism increases the average equity premium.  In section III I focus 
on the effects of doubt on asset returns.  I show that doubt reduces the riskfree rate and 
increases the average equity premium.   
Pessimism and doubt can help resolve important asset pricing puzzles.  As already 
mentioned, both pessimism and doubt reduce the riskfree rate, and thus they can help 
resolve the riskfree rate puzzle discussed by Weil (1989).  Uniform pessimism and doubt 
both increase the average equity premium and thus can help resolve the equity premium 
puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985).  To analyze the joint quantitative impact of 
pessimism and doubt, I assume in section IV that aggregate consumption growth is 
lognormal, and I calculate the riskfree rate and average equity premium under pessimism 
and doubt.   
In section V, I calculate the values of the preference parameters that allow a 
calibrated version of the model with lognormality to match the historical average values 
of the riskfree rate and the equity premium.  In the case of rational expectations, the value 
of the coefficient of relative risk aversion that allows the model to match the historical 
average equity premium is much higher than is conventionally deemed to be plausible.  
This high value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is a reflection of the equity 
premium puzzle.  I go on to show that with pessimism and doubt a calibrated version of 
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the model can match the historical average equity premium with a much lower coefficient 
of relative risk aversion that is in the conventional range. 
Having demonstrated the potential impact of pessimism and doubt on asset 
returns, I speculate about the potential sources and interpretations of pessimism and doubt 
in section VI.  I intend this section to be an admission that I have not satisfactorily 
explained the sources of pessimism and doubt.  I also use this section as an opportunity to 
speculate about possible avenues to explore.  I present concluding remarks in section VII. 
I.  Asset Pricing when Consumers’ Subjective Distribution Differs from the 
Objective Distribution 
Consider a Lucas (1978) fruit-tree economy in which the only source of output is 
a large number of identical infinitely-lived fruit trees.  Let Yt > 0 be the amount of fruit 
produced by a representative tree in period t.  This fruit is completely perishable after one 
period and cannot be used to increase the number of fruit trees.  The only use for the fruit 
is consumption, and in equilibrium all fruit is consumed in the period in which it is 
produced. 
The economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely-lived 
consumers.  Without loss of generality, normalize the number of consumers to equal the 
number of trees, which implies that Yt is the amount of output per consumer or, 
equivalently, the dividend per consumer.  All consumers have identical utility functions, 
identical initial asset holdings (equal to one fruit tree), and identical subjective 
distributions about future growth rates of Yt.  Thus, I can focus on the behavior of a 
representative consumer. 
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Let ct be the consumption in period t chosen by the representative consumer, and 
let Ct be the aggregate consumption per consumer in period t.  In equilibrium, ct = Ct = Yt, 
where ct = Ct reflects the assumption that all consumers are identical, and Ct = Yt reflects 
the fact that all output is consumed in the period in which it is produced.  Therefore, 
individual consumption, ct, and aggregate consumption per consumer, Ct, inherit the 
stochastic properties of the exogenous dividend process.  Define Xt > 0 as the gross 
growth rate of dividends so that in equilibrium  
111 t
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
C
C
Y
Y
X .                                                          (1) 
Assume that Xt is i.i.d. over time which implies that ln Yt , ln Ct, and ln ct evolve 
as random walks, possibly with drift.  Assume that all consumers know that Xt is i.i.d. 
over time.  Let F(Xt) be the true, or objective, distribution of Xt and let F*(Xt) be the 
subjective distribution that consumers think governs Xt.  At this point I will not restrict 
the distributions F(Xt) and F*( Xt) except to assume that they are non-degenerate 
distributions with finite moments. 
A representative consumer chooses individual consumption, ct, and holdings of 
shares in fruit trees to maximize 
E ct
j
t j
j
* 1
1
1
0
RST
UVW
                                                          (2) 
where  > 0 is the time preference discount factor,  > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, and the operator Et*{ } denotes the subjective expectation conditional on 
information available at time t using the subjective distribution F*(X).  The utility 
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function in equation (2) is a standard utility function widely used in the asset pricing 
literature except that the expectation is evaluated using the subjective distribution F*(X) 
rather than the objective distribution F(X) as would be the case if consumers had rational 
expectations. 
In equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between ct and ct+1 for the utility 
function in equation (2) is 
M Xt t1 1 .                                                                 (3) 
It is well known that in the absence of any transaction costs or other capital market 
imperfections, the conditional expectation of the product of Mt+1 and Rt+1 equals one, 
where Rt+1 is the gross rate of return on any asset.  When the subjective distribution of 
Xt+1 differs from the objective distribution of Xt+1, it is the subjective distribution that is 
used in calculating the conditional expectation.  Thus,2 
E M Rt t t
*
1 1 1l q .                                                          (4) 
The pricing condition in equation (4) holds for any asset.  I will apply this condition first 
to the riskfree rate and then to the rate of return on equity. 
Let R ft+1 be the gross rate of return on a one-period riskfree asset held from period 
t to period t+1.  Substituting R ft+1 for R t+1 in equation (4), using the expression for the 
                                                          
2 The representative consumer’s Euler equation is .11
1*
t
t
t
t Rc
c
E   Substituting equation (1) into 
this Euler equation and using equation (3) yields equation (4). 
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marginal rate of substitution in equation (3), and recognizing that R ft+1 is known at time t 
yields3 
R
E X
f 1
*m r .                                                              (5) 
The riskfree rate in equation (5) is the riskfree rate that prevails when consumers 
have the subjective distribution F*(Xt).  If consumers have rational expectations, the 
riskfree rate is obtained from equation (5) by replacing the subjective expectation  
E*{X - } by the objective expectation E{X - }.  Calibrations of equation (5) under rational 
expectations typically use historical data on Xt to estimate the moments of the distribution 
of Xt.  When these calibrations use conventional values of the preference parameters  
and , the resulting riskfree rate is much higher than its historical average of one or two 
percent per year in the United States.  The typical finding that the calibrated value of the 
riskfree rate is much higher than the observed average value has been dubbed the 
“riskfree rate puzzle” by Weil (1989).   Later in this paper I will examine the extent to 
which pessimism and doubt can help resolve the riskfree rate puzzle. 
Equity is a claim on the future stream of dividends accruing to a fruit tree.  Thus, 
Pt, the ex-dividend price of equity in period t, is the price of a claim on all dividends 
accruing to a fruit tree from time t+1 onward.  The gross rate of return on equity between 
periods t and t+1 is 
                                                          
3 Because Xt is i.i.d. over time, the conditional expectation Et*{Xt+1- } equals the unconditional expectation 
E*{Xt+1- }.  The time subscript t+1 is omitted from X -  without loss of generality or clarity here and 
elsewhere in the paper. 
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t
tte
t P
YP
R 111 .                                                              (6) 
Because the growth rate of consumption and dividends, Xt, is i.i.d., and because 
the utility function is isoelastic, the equilibrium ex-dividend price of equity is 
proportional to the current dividend.  Specifically, as can be easily verified, 
Pt = Yt.                                                                       (7) 
Substituting equation (7) into equation (6) and recalling the definition of the gross growth 
rate of dividends in equation (1) yields 
R Xt
e
t1 1
1 .                                                               (8) 
The value of the price-dividend ratio  can be determined by substituting equation 
(8) into equation (4) and using the expression for the marginal rate of substitution in 
equation (3) to obtain 
        1 1
1E X*m r .                                                     (9) 
Finally, substitute equation (9) into equation (8) to obtain the equilibrium rate of return 
on equity 
R X
E Xt
e t
1
1
1*m r .                                                         (10) 
Equation (10) indicates that the equilibrium rate of return on equity is proportional to the 
gross rate of dividend growth.   
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In a very long time series of observations, the sample average rate of return on 
equity equals the objective expectation of the return in equation (10).4  Using the 
objective distribution F(X) to calculate this expectation yields 
E R
E X
E X
em r l qm r* 1 .                                                   (11) 
The ex post equity premium is the amount by which the realized rate of return on 
equity exceeds the riskfree rate.  In ratio form, the equity premium is 
R
R
X E X
E X
t
e
f
t1 1
1
*
*
m r
m r                                                           (12) 
and the objective expectation of the equity premium is  
E R
R
E X E X
E X
e
f
m r l q m r
m r
*
* 1
.                                                    (13) 
The average equity premium that prevails under rational expectations is obtained 
from equation (13) by replacing the subjective expectations E X*m r  and E X* 1m r  by 
the respective objective expectations E Xm r  and E X 1m r .  Calibrations of the 
average equity premium under rational expectations using conventional values of the 
                                                          
4 In a very long time series of observations, consumers might learn the objective distribution, thereby making 
the subjective distribution identical to the objective distribution.  In this paper, I ignore learning, which is 
consistent with the viewpoint of robust control, which I discuss in section VI.  Anderson, Hansen, and 
Sargent (2000, p. 4) state:  “The perspective of a robust decision maker differs substantially from that of one 
who learns.  In our dynamic settings, the robust decision maker accepts model misspecification as a 
permanent state of affairs, and devotes his thoughts to designing robust controls, rather than to using data to 
improve his model specification over time.  The robust decision maker turns his back on learning.” 
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preference parameters  and   typically yield an equity premium that is much smaller 
than the historical average equity premium of about 6% per year in the United States. 
II.  The Effect of Pessimism on Asset Returns 
I will use the term pessimism to mean that consumers’ subjective distribution 
F*(X) is first-order stochastically dominated by the objective distribution F(X).  In this 
section I will show that pessimism can help resolve the both the riskfree rate and equity 
premium puzzles.   
First consider the effect of pessimism on the riskfree rate.  Since X -  is a strictly 
decreasing function of X, pessimism implies that  E*{X - } is larger than E{X - }.  Thus, it 
follows immediately from equation (5) that pessimism reduces the riskfree rate relative to 
the riskfree rate that would prevail under rational expectations.  
The role of pessimism in reducing the riskfree rate has a simple interpretation.  If 
consumers are pessimistic about the growth rate of dividends, then, relative to the case of 
rational expectations, they will attempt to reduce current consumption and increase 
current saving.  The attempt to increase current saving puts downward pressure on the 
real interest rate.  Equivalently, a low expected growth rate of consumption can be 
consistent with optimality only if the real interest rate is low. 
Because pessimism reduces the riskfree rate, it can help explain the riskfree rate 
puzzle.  To analyze the magnitude of the impact of pessimism on the riskfree rate I will 
introduce the notion of  uniform pessimism, which I define as a leftward translation of the 
objective distribution of x  ln X.  Specifically, the subjective distribution F*(X) is 
characterized by uniform pessimism if 
 10 
 F*(X) = F(Xe )                                                           (14) 
for  > 0.  It is straightforward to show that under uniform pessimism 
 E X e E Xa a a*m r m r                                                      (15) 
for an arbitrary constant a.  
I will use a circumflex to denote a rate of return that would prevail under rational 
expectations.  For instance, R f  is the gross riskfree rate under rational expectations.  
Letting lnr Rf f denote the net riskfree rate under rational expectations and rP
f  denote 
the net riskfree rate, ln R f, under uniform pessimism, it follows from equations (5) and 
(15) that 
r rP
f f .                                                               (16) 
Equation (16) indicates that uniform pessimism reduces the riskfree rate by . 
Now consider the effect of uniform pessimism on the average equity premium.  
Define ln /E R Re fn se j  as the (logarithm of the) objective expectation of the equity 
premium that would prevail under rational expectations and define P as the logarithm of 
the objective expectation of the equity premium, ln [E{R e}/R f], under pessimism.  It 
follows from equations (13) and (15) that  
P ,                   under uniform pessimism                   (17) 
According to equation (17), uniform pessimism increases the average equity 
premium by .  To understand this effect, it is helpful to examine the subjective 
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expectation of the equity premium, E*{R e}/ R f.  It follows from equations (12) and (15) 
that 
E R
R
E R
R
e
f
e
f
*m r n s
,             under uniform pessimism.            (18) 
Equation (18) shows that the equity premium (subjectively) expected by consumers with 
uniform pessimism is identical to the equity premium expected by consumers in a rational 
expectations equilibrium.  Thus, uniform pessimism has no effect on consumers’ 
subjective expectation of the equity premium.  The reason that pessimism increases the 
objective expectation of the equity premium is not that pessimistic consumers require a 
higher equity premium.  Instead, they require the same equity premium as under rational 
expectations, but their pessimism leads them to underestimate the mean growth rate of 
dividends and hence the average rate of return on equity.  Thus, the objective expectation 
of the equity premium is greater than consumers expect and hence is greater than the 
expectation of the equity premium under rational expectations.  Indeed, because 
consumers underestimate the average net growth rate xt  lnXt by , they underestimate 
the net expected return to equity by .  Thus, pessimism increases the objective 
expectation of the equity premium by . 
III.  The Effects of Doubt on Asset Returns 
In this section I analyze the effects of doubt on asset returns.  I will use the term 
doubt to mean that consumers’ subjective distribution F*(X) is a mean-preserving spread 
of the objective distribution F(X).  To determine the effect of doubt on the riskfree rate, 
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observe that X -  is a strictly convex function of X because > 0.  Hence, a mean-
preserving spread on the distribution of X increases the expected value of X - .   
Therefore, if the subjective distribution F*(X) is characterized by doubt, E*{X - } is larger 
than E{X - }, and it follows immediately from equation (5) that doubt reduces the riskfree 
rate relative to the riskfree rate that would prevail under rational expectations.  
There is a simple economic explanation for the effect of doubt on the riskfree rate.  
An increase in doubt increases consumers’ perceived risk.  This increase in perceived risk 
leads consumers to seek safety in the riskfree asset, which drives up the price of the 
riskfree asset, or equivalently, drives down the riskfree rate. 
To measure the effect of doubt on the expected equity premium, define  
22 1ln*
*
1ln
XE
XVar
XE
XVar ,                                              (19) 
where E*{X} and Var*{X} are the mean and variance, respectively, of F*(X), and E{X} 
and Var{X} are the mean and variance, respectively, of F(X).  The parameter  is 
approximately equal to the difference in the squared coefficient of variation of X when 
comparing F(X) and F*(X).  I show in the Appendix that under doubt, with E*{X} = E{X} 
and Var*{X} > Var{X}, 
ln ln*E X E X a aa am r m r b g1
2
1 0 .                                         (20) 
Define D as the logarithm of the objective expectation of the equity premium, ln 
[E{R e}/R f], under doubt.  It follows from equations (13) and (20) that under doubt 
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D .                                                     (21) 
Equation (21) shows that doubt causes the expected equity premium to exceed the 
expected equity premium under rational expectations, , by . 
To understand the effect of doubt in equation (21), it is helpful to examine the 
subjective expectation of the equity premium, E*{Re}/R f.  It follows from equations (12) 
and (20) that  
ln /*E R Re fm r ,               under doubt.          (22) 
According to equation (22), consumers require a higher (subjective) expected 
equity premium under doubt than under rational expectations because they perceive a 
higher level of risk associated with equity.  The increase in the required equity premium, 
, is proportional to the coefficient of relative risk aversion  and to the perceived 
increase in risk .   
IV. Lognormality 
I have shown that uniform pessimism and doubt both reduce the riskfree rate and 
increase the average equity premium.  These results do not depend on the specification of 
the distribution F(X).  To illustrate the quantitative impacts of uniform pessimism and 
doubt on these rates of return, and to examine the role of preference parameters, I will 
assume that F(X) and F*(X) are lognormal.  The assumption that xt  ln Xt is normal is 
commonly adopted in studies of asset pricing. 
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Suppose that the objective distribution of ln Xt is N( , 2) and that the subjective 
distribution of ln Xt is N( *, 2) where *    -  - ½ ,  *2  2 + , > 0, and   > 0.  
The assumption of lognormality implies that for an arbitrary constant a  
E X a aam r LNM
O
QPexp
1
2
2 2                                               (23a) 
and 
 E X E X a a aa a* expm r m r b gLNM
O
QP
1
2
1  .                               (23b) 
Using equations (5) and (23a) yields the net riskfree rate under rational 
expectations  
lnr f 1
2
2 2 .                                                   (24) 
Using equations (5) and (23b), the riskfree rate under pessimism and doubt is  
r rf f 1
2
1b g .                                                  (25) 
Equation (25) reiterates the findings from sections II and III that both pessimism (  > 0) 
and doubt (  > 0) reduce the riskfree rate relative to the riskfree rate under rational 
expectations.  Under lognormality, the effects of pessimism and doubt are additive. 
The average equity premium under rational expectations is calculated using 
equations (13) and (23a) to obtain 
2 .                                                                  (26) 
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The average equity premium under pessimism and doubt is calculated using equations 
(13) and (23b) to obtain 
.                                                            (27) 
As noted earlier, uniform pessimism (  > 0) and doubt (  > 0) increase the average equity 
premium relative to its value under rational expectations.  Equation (27) illustrates that in 
the case of lognormality the effects on the equity premium of uniform pessimism and 
doubt are additive. 
Equations (25) and (27) show that pessimism and doubt—either separately or in 
combination—can help resolve the riskfree rate and equity premium puzzles.  The 
riskfree puzzle is that rational expectations asset pricing models produce a riskfree rate 
that is too high, but equation (25) shows that pessimism and doubt reduce the riskfree 
rate.  The equity premium puzzle is that rational expectations models produce an average 
equity premium that is too low, but equation (27) shows that both pessimism and doubt 
increase the average equity premium. 
V.  Choosing Preference Parameters Values to Match Sample Mean Returns 
In this section I present an alternative view of the equity premium and riskfree rate 
puzzles by calculating the values of  and  that allow the model to match the historical 
average values of  r f and .  I will maintain the assumption that F(X) and F*(X) are 
lognormal and analyze the quantitative extent to which pessimism and doubt can help 
resolve the equity premium and riskfree rate puzzles. 
Let a bar over a variable denote the average value of a variable in a historical 
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sample of data.  Thus, r f  is the sample average value of the net riskfree rate r f, and  is 
the sample average value of the equity premium .  Mehra and Prescott (1985) report that 
for the period 1889-1978, r f = 0.0080 and = 0.0595.5  The challenge posed by Mehra 
and Prescott is to calibrate the parameters of consumption growth,  and , to match U.S. 
data, and then to find plausible values of the preference parameters  and  for which the 
predicted value of the riskfree rate equals the sample value r f  and the predicted value of 
the average equity premium equals the sample value . 
It is straightforward to find the values of  and  that allow the model’s 
predictions of r f and  to match the sample values r f and  respectively.  Let * be the 
value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion for which the model’s prediction of the 
average equity premium equals the sample value  when consumers have the subjective 
distribution F*(X).  To calculate *, set  equal to  in equation (27) and use equation 
(26) to obtain 
*
2  .                                                         (28) 
Let * be the value of  for which the model’s predictions of r f and  equal the respective 
sample values r f and .  Setting r f = r f in equation (25) and using equation (24) yields 
* * * * *expLNM
O
QPr
f b g c h1
2
1
2
12 2 .                               (29) 
                                                          
5 Mehra and Prescott found the average riskfree rate was 0.0080 and the average rate of return on equity was 
0.0698.  Thus r f = ln (1.0080) = 0.0080 and    ln(1.0698/1.0080) = 0.0595. 
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Let and  be the values of the preference parameters that allow the model’s 
predictions under rational expectations to match the sample values r f and .  The values 
of and  are obtained from equations (28) and (29) by setting  =  = 0 to obtain 
2                                                                  (30)       
and 
expLNM
O
QPr
f 1
2
2 2 .                                                (31) 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) report the moments of consumption growth for the 
period 1889-1978 to be E{X} = 1.0183 and Var{X} = (0.0357)2.  Since ln X is N( , 2), 
these values for the mean and variance of X imply that  = 0.01752 and  = 0.03505.6   
Using these sample values along with r f = 0.0080 and  = 0.0595, equation (30) yields 
 = 48.44.  Mehra and Prescott state that reasonable values for  are in the range from 0 
to 10.  Because  is so much larger than 10, Mehra and Prescott argue that their model 
(which includes the assumption of rational expectations) fails to account for the sample 
average equity premium.   
Despite the contention by Mehra and Prescott that the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion  must be smaller than 10, Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) argue forcefully that 
there is no evidence that would lead one to rule out values of  greater than 10.  Using  
= 48.44 from equation (30), equation (31) implies that the value of  is 0.549.   This low 
                                                          
6 Since ln X is N( , 2), E{X} = exp[ + (1/2) 2] and Var{X}/[E{X}]2 = exp( 2) - 1. 
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value of  is a consequence of the strong precautionary saving motive induced by the 
high value of .  A strong desire for precautionary saving puts downward pressure on the 
interest rate.  In order to prevent the interest rate from being too low (or even negative) 
consumers must have a high rate of time preference, which is captured by a low value of 
.7   
Pessimism and doubt can help resolve the riskfree rate puzzle and the equity 
premium puzzle by allowing the model to match the sample moments r f  and  using 
values of the preference parameters  and  that are in the range examined by Mehra and 
Prescott.  Table 1 presents the values of * and * for various combinations of pessimism, 
measured by , and doubt, measured by .  Each row of Table 1 corresponds to a fixed 
level of doubt, which is given in the first column.  The level of doubt in each row is 
represented by two (equivalent) values in the first column: the top element in each cell in 
the first column is the value of  and the bottom element in each cell is the standard 
deviation of the subjective distribution in the absence of pessimism (i.e., when  = 0).  
Each column of Table 1 (except the first column which contains   and S.D.*{X} for  = 
0) corresponds to a fixed level of pessimism which is represented by the value of  at the 
top of the column.  All of the cells contain two numbers representing preference 
parameters:  the top number is * and the bottom number is *. 
                                                          
7 Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) do not have such a low value of  because their model has a richer structure 
of serial correlation for Xt, which changes the implied moments of asset returns. 
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Table 1 
Values of * and * under Pessimism ( ) and Doubt ( ) 
S.D.*{X} for  = 0 0 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.055 
0 48.44 44.37 40.30 32.16 24.02 3.66 
0.0357 0.549 0.516 0.495 0.485 0.516 0.858 
0.0010 26.70 24.46 22.21 17.73 13.24 2.02 
0.0481 0.706 0.684 0.669 0.663 0.687 0.915 
0.0020 18.43 16.88 15.33 12.24 9.14 1.39 
0.0579 0.777 0.761 0.750 0.747 0.766 0.937 
0.0040 11.38 10.42 9.47 7.55 5.64 0.86 
0.0737 0.844 0.833 0.827 0.826 0.841 0.957 
0.0060 8.23 7.54 6.85 5.46 4.08 0.62 
0.0867 0.875 0.868 0.864 0.864 0.877 0.966 
0.0100 5.30 4.85 4.41 3.52 2.63 0.40 
0.1082 0.905 0.901 0.899 0.901 0.911 0.974 
0.0150 3.67 3.36 3.05 2.43 1.82 0.28 
0.1302 0.923 0.921 0.920 0.923 0.931 0.979 
0.0163 3.39 3.11 2.82 2.25 1.68 0.26 
0.1354 0.926 0.924 0.923 0.926 0.935 0.980 
 
The case of rational expectations is shown in the first row of results (  = 0, 
S.D.*{X} = 0.0357) and in the column headed  = 0.  In this case there is neither 
pessimism nor doubt.  This cell shows that the model with rational expectations will 
match the riskfree rate and average equity premium with  = 48.44 and  = 0.549, as 
discussed above.  Moving to the right across the first row, pessimism, measured by , 
increases.  As  increases, * decreases linearly in .  The value of *  first falls and then 
increases as  increases.8  Starting from the rational expectations cell and moving down 
                                                          
8 Substituting equation (28) into equation (29) and rearranging yields 
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this column, the degree of doubt, measured by , increases.  As doubt increases, * 
decreases and * increases.9  Thus, both pessimism and doubt, either individually or in 
combination, can reduce * and increase *, thereby moving both preference parameters 
toward the conventional values that were the focus of Mehra and Prescott. 
One’s view of the equity premium puzzle and the riskfree rate puzzle depends on 
the range of preference parameter values that one regards as plausible.  Underlying the 
seminal discussion of the equity premium puzzle by Mehra and Prescott is the belief that 
the preference parameters  and  must satisfy  0 <  < 10 and 0 <  < 1.  As noted 
earlier, Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) argue that there is no compelling reason to restrict 
 to be less than ten.  Nevertheless, much of the literature regards 10 as an upper bound 
for .  For comparability with this literature, I have shaded those cells in Table 1 for 
which 0 < * < 10 and 0 <  * < 1.  To the extent that the equity premium puzzle 
represents a challenge to match r f and  with values of  and  deemed reasonable by 
Mehra and Prescott, the shaded cells represent combinations of pessimism and doubt that 
meet this challenge, though the levels of pessimism and doubt may be implausibly high in 
some cases. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ln * FHG
I
KJr
f
2
1
2
b g  so that ln * is quadratic in the pessimism parameter . 
9 Differentiating equation (28) with respect to   yields d
d
* *
2 0  if * > 0.  
 
Taking the logarithm of each side of equation (29), differentiating with respect to  , and using equation (28) 
yields d
d
d
d
ln * * * * *L
NM
O
QP
1
2
1 1
2
2c h c h .  Then using the expression for dd
*
 yields  
d
d
ln * * F
HG
I
KJ
L
NM
O
QP2
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2
1
2
1
2
.   In Table 1,  0.0595,  = 0.0183, and  = 0.0357 so 
1
2
1
2
0 01082 . .  Therefore, d
d
ln * 0 , if * > 0 and  > 0. 
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VI.  The Sources and Sizes of Pessimism and Doubt:  Some Speculative Thoughts 
I have demonstrated that pessimism and doubt may help resolve the riskfree rate 
and equity premium puzzles, but this demonstration leads naturally to the next question:  
How much pessimism and doubt might characterize subjective distributions?  It is 
difficult to answer this question without a more complete understanding of the sources of 
pessimism and doubt, and the persistence of these departures from rationality.  It may be 
tempting to gauge the amount of pessimism or doubt by using sampling theory to estimate 
the standard errors of the estimates of the moments of growth rates, but this approach 
presumes that the source of pessimism and doubt is simply sampling error.  At this point 
in the exploratory analysis, I would entertain a broader class of potential sources of 
departures from rationality.   
A complete analysis of possible sources of pessimism and doubt is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but I will take this opportunity to illustrate quantitatively, without 
necessarily endorsing, one possible source.  In the Lucas (1978) fruit-tree model used 
here, consumption, output, and dividends are identically equal and hence the growth rate 
Xt represents the growth rate of consumption, the growth rate of output, and the growth 
rate of dividends.  The majority of the asset pricing literature calibrates Xt using 
consumption data.  But what if consumers used dividend data to calibrate Xt ?  Cecchetti, 
Lam, and Mark (1990, Table 1, p. 402) report moments of annual growth rates of 
consumption (1889-1985), output (1869-1985), and dividends (1871-1985), all in real per 
capita terms.  The mean growth rate of dividends was only -0.38% per year compared 
with the mean consumption growth rate of 1.84% per year.  Thus, if the sample mean 
growth rate of dividends were used as the subjective mean of Xt, the degree of pessimism, 
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, would equal 0.0184 - (-0.0038) = 0.0222.  The standard deviation of dividend growth 
was 0.1359 and the standard deviation of consumption growth was only 0.0379.  Thus, if 
the standard deviation of dividend growth were used as the standard deviation of F*(X), 
while the mean growth rate of consumption, 1.84% per year, is used as the mean of 
F*(X),10 then   would equal ln(1 + (0.1359/1.0183)2) – ln(1 + (0.0379/1.0183)2) = 
0.0163.  Table 1 shows that if  = 0 and  = 0.0163, then * = 3.39 and * = 0.926, 
values that are well within the conventional range established by Mehra and Prescott.  
Another interpretation of pessimism and doubt is based on the equivalence of 
risk-sensitive optimal control and robust control discussed by Hansen, Sargent, and 
Tallarini (1999) and references cited therein.  Risk-sensitive optimal control introduces a 
single new parameter in the intertemporal utility function that can magnify the sensitivity 
of optimal behavior to risk even when the subjective distribution of growth rates is 
identical to the objective distribution.  In contrast to risk-sensitive optimal control, which 
alters the intertemporal utility function without departing from rational expectations, 
robust control does not alter the usual intertemporal utility function, but allows the 
subjective distribution to differ from the objective distribution.  In particular, under robust 
control, a consumer views her specification of the distribution function for the growth 
rate X as an approximation in the sense that she believes that there is a set of candidate 
distribution functions near the approximating model that might actually govern the 
growth rate.11,12  Robust decision rules have favorable properties even if one of these 
                                                          
10 This is a case of pure doubt, i.e., no pessimism, with the objective distribution represented by the historical 
distribution of consumption growth rates. 
11 The "risk-sensitivity" parameter can be viewed as describing the size of the set of distributions near the 
consumer's approximating model. 
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other distributions turns out to govern the data.  The robust decision maker designs a 
decision rule by formulating a min-max game in which nature chooses a distribution from 
this set to minimize the consumer’s utility.  By playing a best response against that 
minimizing distribution, it turns out that the consumer’s decision rule works well enough 
over the set of distributions near the approximating model.  Thus, the consumer acts "as 
if" she is pessimistic in order to achieve robustness.  One might interpret the subjective 
distribution F*(X) in the current paper as the most unfavorable distribution of growth 
rates X in a set of candidate distributions for a consumer solving a robust control problem.  
Though the framework in this paper is not identical to that in Hansen, Sargent, and 
Tallarini (1999), one might be able to establish a similar equivalence between the 
decision problem in this paper and a form of risk-sensitive control, but at this point, such 
an equivalence is merely speculation. 
A completely different interpretation of the distributions F(X) and F*(X) is based 
on the Peso problem, in which investors take account of the possibility of unlikely large 
events that do not occur during the sample period studied.  In the framework of the Peso 
problem, one might interpret F*(X), which governs consumers’ decisions, as the true 
distribution of growth rates.  The distribution F*(X) may assign a small positive 
probability to a very adverse realization of the growth rate, i.e., to a very low realization 
of X.13  In the Peso problem framework, the distribution F(X) would be the empirical 
distribution of growth rates observed during a sample period.  If the very adverse 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2000) and Maenhout (1999) have applied robust control to study asset 
pricing. 
13 A small probability of large adverse events does not fit the lognormal example in sections IV and V, but 
the more general framework in the preceding sections can accommodate a small probability of large unlikely 
events. 
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realization of the growth rate happened not to occur during the sample period, then F(X) 
would differ from F*(X).  Pessimism and doubt that characterize F*(X) reflect unfavorable 
events that have not been observed during the sample period.  Under this interpretation, 
the average equity premium reported in equation (13) is the average value of the 
equilibrium equity premium in samples in which the distribution of growth rates X is 
identical to the empirical distribution observed during the sample period.  It is an 
empirical question whether a Peso problem can account for enough pessimism or doubt to 
have a substantial impact on observed equilibrium rates of return.14   
VII.  Conclusion 
I have used a very simple asset pricing model to explore the implications of 
pessimism and doubt for the average returns that would be observed in large samples.  
Within the context of this model, both pessimism and doubt, either individually or 
together, can help resolve the riskfree rate puzzle by reducing the equilibrium riskfree 
rate.  Under pessimism, consumers underestimate the mean growth rate of aggregate 
consumption and thus try to reduce current consumption and increase current saving.  The 
attempt to increase current saving drives down the interest rate.  Doubt reduces the 
interest rate by increasing the perceived risk associated with equity, thereby driving 
consumers to seek safety in the riskfree asset and driving down the interest rate on this 
asset. 
                                                          
14 Reitz (1988) tries to resolve the equity premium puzzle by arguing that consumers are concerned about the 
small possibility of a very large drop in consumption.  Though he does not mention the Peso problem by 
name, he states its essence: “To the extent that equity returns have been high with no crashes, equity owners 
have been compensated for crashes that happened not to occur” (p. 118).  While Reitz claims that the size of 
unlikely (and as yet unobserved) crashes needed to resolve the equity premium puzzle is plausible, Mehra 
and Prescott (1988) argue that these crashes are implausibly large.  Even if the Peso problem cannot plausibly 
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Uniform pessimism and doubt tend to increase the average equity premium and 
thus may help to resolve the equity premium puzzle.  Under uniform pessimism, 
consumers require a (subjective) expected equity premium that is equal to the average 
equity premium under rational expectations.  Though consumers think that the average 
equity premium will be relatively small, as it is under rational expectations, the average 
equity premium turns out larger than consumers expect precisely because consumers’ 
expectations of consumption growth, and hence equity returns, are biased downward 
under pessimism.  Doubt increases the average equity premium through a different 
channel:  under doubt, consumers perceive a higher degree of risk associated with equity 
and thus require a higher expected equity premium. 
The effects of pessimism and doubt on asset returns are encouraging because each 
of these features, represented by a single parameter, can individually move both the 
riskfree rate and the average equity premium in the “right” directions.  In the context of 
the illustrative example in which consumers use historical dividend growth to estimate 
the standard deviation of Xt, doubt alone could resolve the equity premium puzzle without 
appeal to any pessimism at all.  Specifically, using only doubt, the model could match the 
sample mean riskfree rate and sample mean equity premium with preference parameters 
well within the range of values deemed permissible by Mehra and Prescott.   
I have emphasized that the analysis here is exploratory.  I used a very simple asset 
pricing model for a brief foray into the territory of nonrational expectations to see 
whether departures from rationality might have interesting asset pricing implications in 
general, and whether they could help resolve some asset pricing anomalies in particular.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
resolve the equity premium puzzle by itself, it may have a substantial quantitative impact on asset returns and 
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The results of this foray are encouraging.  It appears that pessimism, and perhaps 
especially doubt, may have quantitatively important effects on the moments of asset 
returns.  Given the potential quantitative importance of these departures from rationality, 
the next challenge is to explain why pessimism and doubt may occur.  The results of this 
paper suggest that understanding such departures from rationality may greatly extend our 
understanding of asset returns. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
could be one of several factors contributing to a resolution.  
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Appendix:  Effect of Doubt on E{Xa} 
Suppose that F*(X) is characterized by doubt and let X be the common mean of F(X) and 
F*(X).  Define g(X)  Xa.  The second-order Taylor series expansion of g(X) around X is 
g X a X a a XX
a
X
a
X X
a
Xb g b g b g b g1 2 212 1 .                       (A1) 
Take the expectation of both sides of equation (A1) using F(X) to obtain 
E X E g X a aa X
X
X
am r b gm r b gLNM
O
QP
1 1
2
1
2
2                                   (A2) 
where X  is the standard deviation of F(X).  Take the expectation of both sides of 
equation (A1) using F*(X) to obtain 
E X E g X a aa D
X
X
a* *m r b gm r b gLNM
O
QP
1 1
2
1
2
2                                 (A3) 
where D >  is the standard deviation of F*(X), which is characterized by doubt.  Take 
logarithms of both sides of equations (A2) and (A3) and use ln (1+z)  z to obtain 
ln ln*E X E X a aa a D
X
X
X
m r m r b gFHG
I
KJ
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2
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2
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2
2 .                               (A4) 
Observe that 01ln1ln 2
2
2
2
X
X
X
D  and use ln (1+z)  z to obtain  
D
X
X
X
2
2
2
2 , so that equation (A4) can be rewritten as 
ln ln*E X E X a aa am r m r b g1
2
1 0 .                                           (A5) 
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